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Abstract
We provide deterministic, polynomial-time computable voting rules
that approximate Dodgson’s and (the “minimization version” of) Young’s
scoring rules to within a logarithmic factor. Our approximation of
Dodgson’s rule is tight up to a constant factor, as Dodgson’s rule
is NP-hard to approximate to within some logarithmic factor. The
“maximization version” of Young’s rule is known to be NP-hard to
approximate by any constant factor. Both approximations are simple,
and natural as rules in their own right: Given a candidate we wish to
score, we can regard either its Dodgson or Young score as the edit dis-
tance between a given set of voter preferences and one in which the
candidate to be scored is the Condorcet winner. (The difference be-
tween the two scoring rules is the type of edits allowed.) We regard the
marginal cost of a sequence of edits to be the number of edits divided
by the number of reductions (in the candidate’s deficit against any of
its opponents in the pairwise race against that opponent) that the edits
yield. Over a series of rounds, our scoring rules greedily choose a se-
quence of edits that modify exactly one voter’s preferences and whose
marginal cost is no greater than any other such single-vote-modifying
sequence.
1 Introduction
A voting rule takes a collection of voter preferences (over some fixed set of candidates,
or alternatives) and aggegrates them into a single ranking, ideally in a way that is as
“fair” as possible to the voters. Arrow’s famous impossibility theorem [Arr50] states
that no such rule over three or more candidates meets all reasonable fairness criteria.
So when considering such rules it may be important to know which criteria they do and
do not meet.
One such criterion, which actually predates those studied explicitly by Arrow, is
credited to the Marquis de Condorcet [Con85].1 A candidate that, against any opposing
candidate, is preferred by a majority of voters is called the Condorcet winner. Note
1In fact, centuries earlier Lull considered essentially the same criterion [HP01].
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that different majorities may prefer the Condorcet winner to different opponents. Note
also that such a winner may not exist, but if it does then it is unique. The Condorcet
criterion states that, whenever a Condorcet winner does exist, it must be declared the
winner. See [You77] for a nice discussion of its virtues.
Unfortunately, many widely used rules, such as plurality, instant-runoff, and Borda
count do not have this very natural property. Many that do bring with them undesirable
features, for instance Copeland elections [Cop51] tend to frequently result in ties. Oth-
ers, such as those due to Dodgson [Dod76], Kemeny [Kem59], and Young2 [You77]
are NP-hard to compute [BTT89, RSV03]. In fact, they are complete with respect to
parallel access to NP [HHR97, HSV05, RSV03], which means that even if the prob-
lem of determining the winner according to one these rules is “merely” in NP , the
polynomial hierarchy would collapse (to NP).
We can view Dodgson’s and Young’s rules as variations on a theme: Given a list,
or profile, of the voters’ preferences (here as is standard in the theory of voting we take
each voter’s preferences to be a total ranking over all the candidates) and a candidate
we wish to score, either rule takes as the candidate’s score the edit distance [CLRS01]
between the given preference profile and one that makes the candidate a Condorcet
winner. In other words, it is the number of edits (exactly what an edit is depends on
the particular scoring rule) needed to reduce to zero the vote deficit between the given
candidate and each of its rivals. Candidates are then ranked in increasing order by their
scores. In Young’s rule, an edit simply deletes one voter from the list. For Dodgson,
an edit takes one voter’s ranking and replaces it with one just like it, except that in the
new one the positions of one pair of candidates ranked adjacently in the original list are
swapped. Clearly, both rules satisfy the Condorcet criterion, as any Condorcet winner
has a score of zero.
A simple example illustrates how scoring works. Let a, b, c, d, and e be five
candidates and let
a >1 b >1 c >1 d >1 e
a >2 b >2 c >2 d >2 e
d >3 a >3 e >3 c >3 b
d >4 a >4 e >4 c >4 b
c >5 e >5 b >5 d >5 a
be a preference profile having five voters. In this example, no candidate is a Condorcet
winner. Note that c is preferred over b, d, and e by majorities of voters and is losing
to a by four votes. To make c the Condorcet winner, we could swap c with b and then
with a in voter one and two’s rankings. It turns out there is no shorter sequence of
swaps that makes c the Condorcet winner, so the Dodgson score of c is four. Note that
in this case, the swaps between c and b do not actually reduce c’s vote deficit, since c
is already beating b.
2Kemeny’s voting rule is sometimes called the Kemeny-Young rule, as Young studied it and made some
important breakthroughs [YL78, You88], e.g., he showed that it satisfies the Condorcet criterion. The Young-
only rule to which we refer is distinct from the Kemeny-Young rule, which to avoid confusion we will call
simply “Kemeny.”
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Candidate d is losing to c and b by one vote each. To make d the Condorcet winner,
we could remove voters one and two. Thus d’s Young score is two. In this case, both
removals yield two deficit reductions, but in general the number of deficit reductions
that each removal yields will vary.
As Procaccia et al. observe [PFR07], McCabe-Dansted effectively proves that it is
hard to Ω(logm)-approximate Dodgson elections, where m is the number of candi-
dates [MD06]. In the same paper, Procaccia et al. show that it is hard to approximate
the “maximization version” of Young’s score—i.e., where the Young score is taken to
be the largest subset of voters that makes a given candidate the Condorcet winner3—by
any constant factor [PFR07].
In this paper we present a framework for efficient, edit-based scoring rules. From
this framework, we obtain O(logm) approximations of the scoring rules due to Dodg-
son and Young. The basic idea is very simple: Given a profile of voter preferences
and a candidate we wish to score, let the marginal cost of a sequence of edits be the
number of edits divided by the number of times that, as the edits are applied, the vote
deficit against the candidate we wish to score is reduced. Now, proceed over a series of
rounds to edit the profile until the chosen candidate becomes the Condorcet winner. In
each round, greedily choose a voter and a sequence of edits on that voter’s preferences
that, over all such voters and sequences, has the minimum marginal cost.
It turns out that, when we restrict the edits the algorithm makes to those allowed
by Dodgson’s (respectively, Young’s) scoring rule, the result is a polynomial-time
O(logm)-approximation, where m is the number of candidates. Thus, in the case
of Dodgson elections, the approximation is tight up to a constant factor.
Why care about approximations to voting rules in the first place? One reason is
that they are themselves voting rules, ones that in some way relate to the rules they
approximate. We feel that our framework supplies approximations that are simple and
natural enough to function as voting rules in their own right.
For instance, suppose a group of voters agrees to only accept a Condorcet winner.
If their stated individual preferences fail to yield one, then the election controller holds
an auction, to entice some of the voters to change their minds.
Taking one candidate at a time, the controller offers to pay each voter for each
reduction in the candidate’s vote deficit it can deliver by changing its stated preferences.
The cost to the voter is the number of edits it needs to make. If the price offered is
less than the cost to the voter, the voter will not accept. If not enough voters accept,
the controller increases the amount offered and the process repeats until the candidate
becomes the Condorcet winner. The score of the candidate is then the total amount of
money offered to the voters and the candidate having the lowest score is the winner.
(No payoffs occur until after all candidates are scored, and only those deals made
during the winning candidate’s scoring round are actually honored, so in effect the
voters “choose” a Condorcet winner.)
The auction thus encourages voters to reveal the true value of their edits, as those
3This is the actual definition due to Young [You77]. Our formulation in terms of deletions is used else-
where (see, e.g., [RSV03, BGN07, Fis77]), and is in many respects equivalent to the original definition
(though certainly not with respect to optimization and approximation results, at least not directly). More-
over, the deletion-based version we use allows us to more naturally build Dodgson’s and Young’s rules into
a single framework.
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who are willing to take the least amount of money per deficit reduction delivered are
rewarded first, while those holding out for more may get nothing. Assuming that all
voters uniformly value their edits at some common unit price, the score the auction
provides (and the order in which it selects the swaps to make) coincides with our rules.
Related work
The study of the approximibility of voting rules is rather new. Ailon et al. [ACN05],
Coppersmith et al. [CFR06], and Kenyon-Mathieu and Schudy [KMS07] study approx-
imation algorithms on Kemeny elections.
As noted above, McCabe-Dansted [MD06] (respectively, Procaccia [PFR07]) pro-
vides lower (respectively, upper) bounds on approximating Dodgson (respectively, Young)
scores. Additionally, Procaccia et al. provide a polynomial-time, randomized algo-
rithm that with probability at least 1/2O(logm)-approximates the Dodgson score [PFR07].
They use a linear program whose optimal solution may assign fractional values to
counts of the swaps made. They then use randomness to help assign integer values
to the swap counts, in a way that yields a feasible, integer-valued solution. Our re-
sults improve on this approach in that our algorithm is completely deterministic and,
we feel, more straightfoward and natural. Additionally, we provide a polynomial-time
approximation of Young scores.
Several researchers provide algorithms that run in polynomial time on key subsets
of the problem domain. Bartholdi et al., in the same seminal paper that established
NP-hardness results for Dodgson and Kemeny elections [BTT89], show that Dodgson
elections can be scored in polynomial time when either the number of candidates or the
number of voters is fixed. Our algorithm runs in polynomial time on all inputs, however
it is does not guarantee to provide a correct answer. Rather, it guarantees upper bounds
on the degree of error.
Homan and Hemaspaandra [HH07] and McCabe-Dansted et al. [MPS07] use a
common insight to provide polynomial-time, deterministic heuristics that, in cases
where the voters greatly outnumber the candidates, compute with high probability the
exact Dodgson score on a candidate and preference profile chosen uniformly at random
from all profiles of some fixed size. Our Dodgson-score-approximating algorithm is a
generalization of sorts of their approach. Though we do not analyze the probability of
exactness our algorithm has, we note here that whenever the Homan and Hemaspaan-
dra approach correctly computes the Dodgson score, so does ours. However, when
their algorithm is not exact, it returns a score that is less than the true edit distance. Our
algorithm never returns a score that is less than the edit distance. Moreover, our algo-
rithm always builds as a side effect an actual sequence of edits leading to a Condorcet
winner.
Finally, Rothe et al. (in the same paper where they establish optimal bounds on the
complexity of Young elections) give a polynomial-time algorithm for computing the
“homogeneous” versions (see [Fis77]) of Dodgson’s and Young’s voting rules [RSV03].
(A voting rule is homogenous if cloning each voter’s preferences some fixed number of
times does not affect the score). They do not discuss the degree to which these scores
approximate Dodgson and Young rules.
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2 Definitions
2.1 Elections
Let V = {1, . . . , n} be a set of voters and C be a set {1, . . . ,m} of candidates. A
ranking of the candidates is a total ordering over C, i.e., 〈cm > cm−1 > · · · > c1〉,
where {c1, . . . , cm} = C. We denote the set of all such rankings L(C). The voters’
preference profile is an n-tuple in L(C)n. For a given preference profile 〈>1, . . . , >n
〉 ∈ L(C)n, i ∈ V , and c ∈ C, let c(>i) denote ||{d ∈ C | c >i d}||.
For every pair of distinct candidates c, d ∈ C and every preference profile P =
〈>1, . . . , >n〉, c’s vote deficit in P with d is Deficit(P, c, d) = min{0, ||{i ∈ V | d >i
c}|| − ||{i ∈ V | c >i d}||}. The total deficit of c is
Deficit(P, c) =
∑
d∈C−{c}
Deficit(P, c, d).
Thus c is a Condorcet winner if and only if Deficit(P, c) = 0. Deficit(P, c) is some-
times known as the Tideman score [Tid87], which forms the basis of the Tideman
(a.k.a., ranked pairs) voting rule.
2.2 Edit-based scoring rules
The building blocks of this paper are edits and deficit reductions. It will be useful to
view them as objects we can label. We now show how to do this.
An edit is a mapping e :
⋃∞
i=0 L(C)
i →
⋃∞
i=0 L(C)
i
. Let P ◦ e denote the
application of e to some preference profile P . A sequence of edits 〈e1, . . . , ep〉 is
called a Condorcet sequence if Deficit(P ◦ e1 ◦ · · · ◦ ep, c) = 0
A swap is an edit, designated by an ordered pair (i, j) ∈ N2, that takes a preference
profile P = 〈>1, . . . , >n〉 and outputs 〈>′1, . . . , >′n〉, which is just like P except that,
if 1 ≤ i ≤ n and 0 < j < m, then for c, d ∈ C satisfying d(>i) = j = c(>i) + 1 it
holds that c(>′i) = j = d(>′i) + 1, i.e., c, d are adjacent in both rankings, d >i c, and
c >′i d. Candidates c and d are said to be involved in the swap.
A deletion is an edit, designated by some i ∈ N, that takes a preference profile
P = 〈>1, . . . , >n〉 in N2 and outputs 〈>1, . . . , >i−1, >i+1, . . . , >n〉.
A deficit reduction is a 4-tuple (P, c, e, d) where P is a preference profile, c and d
are candidates, and e is an edit such that Deficit(P, c, d) > Deficit(P ◦ e, c, d). The
full sequence of deficit reductions with respect to candidate c over a sequence of edits
〈e1, . . . , ep〉 on a preference profile P , denoted D(P, c, 〈e1, . . . , ep〉), is the nonrepeat-
ing sequence of deficit reductions 〈(P1, ei1 , c, d1), . . . , (Pq, eiq , c, dq)〉 of maximum
length such that, for all k ∈ {1, . . . , q}, Pk = P ◦eii ◦· · ·◦eik−1, Deficit(Pk, c, dk) >
Deficit(Pk ◦ eik , c, dk), and for all j ∈ {1, . . . , k − 1}, ij ≤ ik.
We now define, using the terms given above, Dodgson and Young’s scoring rules.
Let S be the collection of all sequences of swaps. The Dodgson score of candidate c in
profile P is the smallest p ∈ N such that
(∃〈e1, . . . , ep〉 ∈ S)[Deficit(P ◦ e1 ◦ · · · ◦ ep, c) = 0].
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Let D be the collection of all sequences of deletions. The Young score of candidate c
in profile P is the smallest p ∈ N such that
(∃〈e1, . . . , ep〉 ∈ D)[Deficit(P ◦ e1 ◦ · · · ◦ ep, c) = 0].
2.3 The generic framework
Below is a generic algorithm for the voting rules we study and approximate. Here, E is a
collection of “legal” sequences of edits, whose exact makeup depends on the particular
scoring rule in question. The variable E is implemented as a priority queue, where
priority is given to sequences of edits S′ that, when applied to the preference profile P ,
have the fewest edits per deficit reduction, i.e., that minimize |S′|/|D(P, c, S′)|. We
call this quantity the marginal cost of S′. We define |S′|/|D(P, c, S′)| = ∞ whenever
|D(P, c, S′)| = 0.
S is a list of edits made.
In order to emphasize the key components of this algorithm, we have omitted im-
portant but mundane steps. For instance, the algorithm needs to compute Deficit(P, c).
We will discuss such details when we discuss the actual Dodgson—and Young—
approximation rules.
Input: A preference profile P and a
candidate c.
1. let S = 〈〉
2. while Deficit(P, c) > 0
3. let S′ =
argminS′′∈E |S
′′|/|D(P, c, S′′)|
4. let 〈e1, . . . , ep〉 = S′
5. let P = P ◦ e1 ◦ · · · ◦ ep
6. concatenate(S, 〈e1, . . . , ep〉)
7. output |S|
3 Approximating Dodgson’s scoring rule
For any candidate c, we say that a sequence of swaps s1, . . . , sp is c-normal on P if,
for each k ∈ {1, . . . , p}, c is involved in swap sk = (i, j) on P ◦ s1 ◦ · · · ◦ sk−1 and
c(<i) = j − 1.
Let P be a preference profile and let E ′ be the collection of all c-normal swap
sequences where, for each sequence, there is a single voter’s preference list to which
all swaps in the sequence apply. Note then that every such sequence has a distinct last
element, so we can represent each sequence in E ′ by storing its last element only. Let
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us call the voting rule based on the generic algorithm with E = E ′ “Marginal-Cost-
Greedy-Dodgson.”
Theorem 1. The running time of Marginal-Cost-Greedy-Dodgson, when E = E ′, is
O(N2 logN), where N is the length of the input.
Proof. Let (P, c) be the input to the algorithm, where E = E ′ and P has m candidates
and n voters. We first need to initialize the data structures used. It takes linear time to
calculate Deficit(P, c, d) on all d ∈ C−{d} (note that we can compute Deficit(P, c) at
the same time). Next we need to initialize E ′. There are at most n(m−1) sequences S′
in E ′, and there are at most m(m− 1)/2 distinct values for |S′|/|D(S′)| that any such
sequence can take. So (regarding E as a priority queue) it takes O(logm) comparisons
to add any such sequence (which we recall is represented by the last element of the
sequence) to E . Note that we can calculate |S′|/|D(S′)| for every sequence S′ in E in
a single pass through P . The worst case is when n is as small as possible, so the worst
case running time for initialization is O(N logN)
After initialization, the algorithm performs swaps on P until c is the Condorcet
winner. Note that any given swap is performed at most once. For each swap applied,
the algorithm must remove the corresponding swap from the queue (since whenever a
swap is applied it follows that the swap sequence ending with that swap has also been
applied), and it must update the marginal cost of each swap sequence remaining in E
that applies to the current voter’s preferences. Thus, every swap may require O(m)
updates to E . Assuming that all swaps in E sharing a common voter are connected
via a linked list, each update can happen in constant time. As during initialization, the
worst case for these procedures occurs when n is as small as possible, so the running
time for this part of the algorithm is O(N2)
Finally, every time a swap causes the deficit against some opponent to go from
positive to zero the entire queue needs to be reprioritized, which means we must
pass through all swap sequences and recalculate This can happen at most (m − 1)
times. Again, the worst-case running time is when n is as small as possible, so it is
O(N2 logN).
We turn now to the approximation bound. Our proof assumes there is a c-normal
Condorcet sequence of swaps witnessing the Dodgson score of c. The following propo-
sition shows that our assumption is valid.
Proposition 2. For every preference profile P and candidate c there is a c-normal
Condorcet swap sequence of length equal to the Dodgson score of c.
Proof. Let p be the Dodgson score of c and 〈s1, . . . , sp〉 be a Condorcet swap se-
quence with respect to candidate c on preference profile P = 〈>1, . . . >n〉. Let
〈>′1, . . . , >
′
n〉 = P ◦ s1 ◦ · · · ◦ sp. Choose i ∈ V and let 〈s′1, . . . , s′q〉 be the sub-
sequence of 〈s1, . . . , sp〉 consisting of all swaps on voter i’s preferences. Let d′ =
argmaxd∈C:c>′
i
d(d(>i) − c(>i)). Since it requires at least d′(>i) − c(>i) swaps in
order for c >′i d′ to hold, it must be the case that |〈s′1, . . . , s′q〉| ≥ d′(>i) − c(>i).
So, removing from S each swap in 〈s′1, . . . , s′q〉 and appending the sequence 〈(i, c(>i
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) + 1), . . . , (i, d′(>i))〉 yields a Condorcet sequence that has no more swaps than S
originally had.
Theorem 3. Marginal-Cost-Greedy-Dodgson is an (lnm+1)-approximation of Dodg-
son score, where m is the number of candidates in the input election.
Proof. Let P be a preference profile over m candidates and n voters and let c be a can-
didate in {1, . . . ,m}. Let x be the Dodgson score of c on P and let S∗ be a c-normal
Condorcet sequence ofP . Let y = Deficit(P, c) and let 〈(P ∗1 , c, s∗1, d∗1), . . . , (P ∗y , c, s∗y, d∗y)〉 =
D(P, c, S∗). Let S be the same as in the algorithm on input (P, c) at the time line 7
is reached (i.e., it is the sequence of all swaps the algorithm applies to P ), and let
〈(P1, c, s1, d1), . . . , (Py, c, sy, dy)〉 = D(P, c, S).
The basic idea behind our proof is that the number of deficit reductions in a se-
quence that witnesses the Dodgson score of c, such as S∗, is equal to the number of
deficit reductions in the sequence S that the algorithm produces. So to compare |S|
to |S∗| we partition the swaps in S (respectively, S∗) among the deficit reductions and
then match the deficit reductions in S to those in S∗. The partitioning is easy: For S
it is just the marginal cost associated with each deficit reduction. For S∗ we fudge the
marginal cost in a straightforward way. The matching and the order in which matched
elements are compared are the trickiest parts of the proof.
For every k ∈ {1, . . . , y}, let r(sk) denote the marginal cost the algorithm as-
sociates with sk (i.e., |S′|/|D(P, c, S′)|, where S′ and P are as in line 3 during the
iteration when the algorithm chooses sk to be in S′). Clearly,
|S| =
y∑
k=1
r(sk).
Let σ denote a permutation over {1, . . . , y} that satisfies the following constraints.
1. For every j ∈ {1, . . . , y}, d∗j = dσ(j).
2. For every j, k ∈ {1, . . . , y}, if s∗k = sj then k = σ(j).
Clearly, such a mapping exists.
For each i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, let S∗i (respectively, D∗i ) be the subsequence of all swaps
in S∗ (respectively, 〈s∗1, . . . , s∗y〉) that apply to voter i only (i.e., all swaps that for some
j are of the form (i, j)). Let p = |D∗i | and let Di = 〈sk1 , . . . , skp〉 be the subsequence
of all swaps in 〈s1, . . . , sy〉 that σ maps to some element in D∗i . In particular, this
subsequence preserves the order in which the algorithm applies the swaps.
We claim, for every q ∈ {1, . . . , p}, that r(skq ) ≤ |S∗i |/(|D∗i | + 1 − q). This
is because, by our construction of σ, at the time the algorithm is about to choose
skq it has not chosen s∗σ(kq) nor any of the other swaps in S
∗
i that come after it (in
fact, the algorithm may not have chosen a single swap in S∗i ). Because the subse-
quence 〈sk1 , . . . , skp〉 preserves the order in which the swaps were made, the algo-
rithm still needs at this point to close deficits against the candidates dkq , dkq+1 . . . , dkp
(= d∗σ(kq), d
∗
σ(kq+1)
, . . . , d∗σ(kp)).
So at the time the algorithm chooses swap skq , it could instead take the longest
subsequence of S∗i that remains unchosen. Obviously, this subsequence is at most |S∗i |
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swaps long and, as discussed above, it yields at least |D∗i | + 1 − q deficit reductions.
Since skq was chosen as part of a sequence S′ for which |S′|/|D(P, S′, c)| (= r(skq ),
where P here is taken to be in the same state as when S′ was chosen) was as small as
possible, our claim holds. But then
|S| =
y∑
k=i
r(sk)
≤
n∑
i=1
|D∗i |∑
q=1
|S∗i |/(|D
∗
i |+ 1− q)
≤
n∑
i=1
m∑
q=1
|S∗i |/(m+ 1− q)
≤ |S∗| lnm+ 1
4 Approximating Young’s scoring rule
For a given preference profile P , let E ′′ be the collection of all single-element se-
quences of deletions on P . Let us call the voting rule based on the generic algorithm
with E = E ′′ “Marginal-Cost-Greedy-Young.”
Theorem 4. Marginal-Cost-Greedy-Young runs in time O(N2 logN).
Theorem 5. Marginal-Cost-Greedy-Young is a O(logm) approximation of the Young
score, where m is the number of candidates in a given input preference profile.
The proofs of the above theorems are essentially analogous to those of theorems 1
and 3.
5 Conclusion
We provide scoring rules that approximate Dodgson’s and Young’s rules to within log-
arithmic factors. Assuming P 6= NP , the bound on Dodgson’s scoring rule is within a
constant factor of the optimal polynomial-time approximation. Many natural questions
arise from this work. What are the actual optimal polynomial-time approximations to
Dodgson and Young scores, assuming P 6= NP? How frequently do the final can-
didate rankings according to our scoring rules equal those given by Dodgson’s and
Young’s rules on the same input?
Our paper gives a general framework for edit-based scoring rules, in which different
types of edits could be combined to produce an endless stream of distinct voting rules.
The basic problem of comparing, in such a broadened setting, edit distances against the
edit sequences produced by the kind algorithms presented here seems worthy of further
research.
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Finally, in the introduction we explained our voting rules in terms of an auction-like
mechanism, where we assumed that all voters value all edits equally. This suggests an
intriguing line of study: What if that is not how voters feel? For instance, it seems
natural to us that voters would be less willing to make swaps higher up on their prefer-
ence lists, and so would require a higher price to make them. And in many settings we
would expect the value placed on edits to vary across a population of voters. So how
would allowing voters to specify the cost of each edit affect the score our algorithm
produces, compared to the corresponding edit-distance-based score?
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